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We develop a quantitative theory of human capital investment in order to evaluate
the magnitude of cross-country diﬀerences in total factor productivity (TFP) that ex-
plains the variation in per-capita incomes across countries. We build a heterogeneous-
agent economy with cross-sectional variation in ability, schooling, and expenditures on
schooling quality. In our theory, the parameters governing human capital production
and random ability process have important implications for a set of cross-sectional
statistics − Mincer return, variance of earnings, variance of schooling, and intergenera-
tional correlation of earnings. These restrictions of the theory and U.S. household data
are used to pin down the key parameters driving the quantitative implications of the
theory. Our main ﬁnding is that human capital accumulation strongly ampliﬁes TFP
diﬀerences across countries. In particular, we ﬁnd an elasticity of output per worker
with respect to TFP of 2.8: a 3-fold diﬀerence in TFP explains a 20-fold diﬀerence
in output per worker. We argue that the cross-country diﬀerences in human capital
implied by the theory are consistent with a wide array of evidence including earnings
of immigrants in the United States, average mincer returns across countries, and the
relationship between average years of schooling and per-capita income across countries.
The theory implies that using Mincer returns to measure human capital understates
diﬀerences across countries by a factor of 2.
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One of the most important challenges faced by economists is to explain the observed large
diﬀerences in per capita income across countries. In this paper we develop a quantitative
theory of human capital investments in order to evaluate the magnitude of cross-country
diﬀerences in the total factor productivity (TFP) that explains the variation in per capita
income across countries. Building a quantitative theory allows us to circumvent two major
problems faced by growth accounting exercises. First, to date, there are no reliable cross-
country measures of the quality of schooling across countries. If this quality is positively
associated with the level of economic development, the residual in growth accounting ex-
ercises overstates the cross-country diﬀerences in TFP. A second problem arises due to the
(unobserved) covariance of TFP with measures of physical and human capital, which renders
output variance decomposition diﬃcult.
Our approach consists of developing a theory of human capital investments − schooling
time and expenditures on schooling quality − that can be used to quantitatively assess the
sources of cross-country income diﬀerences. We show that the quantitative implications of
human capital theory hinge crucially on the value of the elasticity of human capital with
respect to the expenditure on goods.1 The intuition is simple: If schooling requires only time
inputs, a change in the wage rate aﬀects equally the beneﬁts and the costs of human capital
accumulation, leaving the optimal level of human capital unchanged. On the contrary, when
schooling requires only inputs of goods, an increase in the wage rate raises beneﬁts but not
the costs of schooling, hence increasing the optimal human capital stock. Therefore, the
relative importance of time versus goods inputs determines the responsiveness of human
capital to diﬀerences in the wage rate or TFP.2
1Trostel (1993) and Erosa and Koreshkova (forthcoming) make a similar point when studying the taxation
of income.
2Bils and Klenow (2000) point out that the production of human capital is more intensive in time inputs
than the production of output goods. They and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) argue that, by using a
one-sector growth model, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) overstate the importance of goods inputs in the
production of human capital and, thus, obtain results that understate TFP diﬀerences across countries.
1Developing a quantitative theory, in turn, is a challenging task due to the lack of con-
clusive micro evidence on the expenditure elasticity of human capital: some key human
capital determinants, such as individual ability and private expenditures on education (in-
cluding those outside of formal schooling), are not observed. We address this problem by
building a theory of heterogeneous agents with cross-sectional variation in ability, school-
ing, and expenditures on schooling quality. In our theory, the parameters governing the
human capital technology and random ability process have important implications for a set
of cross-sectional statistics − Mincer return, variance of earnings, variance of schooling, and
intergenerational correlation of earnings − estimates of which are actually available in the
data. Thus we use the restrictions of the theory and U.S. household data to pin down the
key parameters driving the quantitative implications of the theory. We then use the theory
to study income inequality across countries and, in particular, to quantitatively assess how
variations in TFP are ampliﬁed through human capital accumulation into larger diﬀerences
in output per worker across countries.
Our main ﬁnding is that human capital accumulation strongly ampliﬁes TFP diﬀerences
across countries: under the benchmark calibration, the elasticity of output per worker with
respect to TFP is 2.8. This implies that a 3-fold diﬀerence in TFP explains a 20-fold
diﬀerence in the output per worker, observed between the 10 percent richest and 10 percent
poorest countries in the world. In contrast, without human capital accumulation, the same
diﬀerence in TFP generates only a 5-fold diﬀerence in output per worker, with physical
capital being the sole source of ampliﬁcation. Moreover, the theory implies that using Mincer
returns to measure human capital stocks − as typically done in growth accounting exercises
− understates diﬀerences in human capital across rich and poor countries by a factor of 2.
This occurs because Mincer returns do not capture diﬀerences in schooling quality across
countries, which our theory ﬁnds to be quantitatively important.
To evaluate the robustness of our quantitative theory, we perform a sensitivity analysis.
While the calibration of our model involves solving a multi-dimensional mapping from pa-
2rameters to targets, the target for the share of time inputs in expenditures on human capital
has a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on the goods elasticity of human capital (and hence, on the TFP elas-
ticity of output per worker). In our baseline calibration, we use an estimate from Kendrick
(1976) and the U.S. Department of Education (1996) to set the target for the time share
at 90 percent.3 Since this target plays such a crucial role in our results and its accurate
estimate is diﬃcult to obtain, we recalibrate the model economy by targeting alternative
values for the time share: 100, 95, 90, and 85 percent. We ﬁnd that the TFP elasticity of
output per worker varies substantially across the calibrated economies: from 1.49 for the
time share of 100 percent to 3.6 for the time share of 85 percent. These ﬁgures conceal a
dramatic variation in the ampliﬁcation eﬀect of TFP: a 3-fold diﬀerence in TFP translates
into a variation in output per worker that ranges from 5-fold (time share 100 percent) to a
54-fold diﬀerence (time share 85 percent). Given the high sensitivity of results, we confront
the predictions of the calibrated models with cross-country data. To this end, for each of the
speciﬁcations, we generate artiﬁcial cross-country data by simulating economies that vary in
their relative levels of TFP.
Our baseline model economy successfully replicates the cross-country variation in school-
ing and Mincer returns (and so does the economy with a time share of 85 percent). On
the contrary, the model with only time inputs generates neither schooling nor Mincer return
variation across countries − an implication that is grossly at odds with the data. More-
over, the absence of goods in our human capital theory means no cross-country diﬀerences
in schooling quality and hence in human capital, which contradicts the empirical ﬁndings of
Borjas (1987) and Hendricks (2002) on immigrant earnings in the United States. In partic-
ular, Borjas estimates the elasticity of schooling quality with respect to the home-country
per capita income to be 0.12. In our model economies, this elasticity ranges from 0.07 (time
share 95 percent) to 0.16 (time share 85 percent), with our baseline calibration delivering
3While this observation motivates Bils and Klenow (2000) to abstract from modeling investment of goods
altogether in human capital accumulation, our ﬁndings indicate that even a small 10 percent share of goods
in human-capital expenditures generates a large ampliﬁcation eﬀect of TFP diﬀerences across countries.
30.10, the closest value to the Borjas’ estimate. Furthermore, among the alternatives, the
baseline calibration provides the most consistent account of Hendricks’ evidence on immi-
grant earnings. Therefore, we conclude that the cross-country data supports a time-share
target close to 90 percent, as is the case in our baseline calibration, and an associated TFP
elasticity of output per worker of 2.8.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes in detail the economic envi-
ronment. In section 3, we consider a version of the model economy with complete markets
to show how the quantitative implications of the theory for income inequality -within and
across countries- depend crucially on the expenditure elasticity of human capital. We also
derive some valuable insights that help us motivate our calibration strategy. Section 4 lays
out the calibration of the benchmark economy and discusses some properties of this economy.
In section 5, we evaluate the aggregate impact of TFP diﬀerences across countries, perform
a sensitivity analysis, and compare our ﬁndings to related papers in the literature. Section
6 concludes.
2 Economic environment
We consider an economy populated by overlapping generations of people who are altruistic
toward their descendants. People are heterogeneous in skills and physical assets and face
idiosyncratic (uninsurable) uncertainty about their labor earnings. Investment in human
capital involves the investment of children’s time and expenditures by parents that aﬀect the
quality of the human capital of their children. Parents cannot borrow to ﬁnance investment
in human capital. Since the analysis in this paper focuses on steady states, time subscripts
are omitted in the description of the model and use a prime to indicate the next period value
of a given variable.
Demographic structure There is a large number of dynasties (mass one). The economy
is populated by overlapping generations of people who live for 5 periods and are altruistic
4toward their descendants. The model period is set to 16 years. People live three periods
as adults and two periods as children. Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the demographic
structure in the model and the mapping between age in the model and real age in the data.
In order to match individual life expectancy in the model to that observed in the United
States, we introduce an exogenous probability of survival from period 4 to period 5, φ. A
household is composed of a parent-child pair in the ﬁrst two stages and a retired adult in
the last stage. These three stages of the life cycle of households are described in Panel B of
Table 1.
Table 1: Demographic Structure and Life-cycle Stages of Households
Panel A: Demographic Structure
Model Age Real Age Name
1 6-21 child
2 22-37 old child
3 38-53 young adult
4 54-69 old adult
5 70-85 retired adult
Panel B: Life-cycle Stages of Households
Stage Adult Adult’s Age Child Child’s Age
1 young 38-53 child 6-21
2 old 54-69 old child 22-37
3 retired 70-85 − −
Production technologies Output is produced with a constant returns to scale technology,
Y = AK
αH
1−α, 0 < α < 1, (1)
where Y denotes output, K represents physical capital services, H stands for aggregate
human capital services, and A is total factor productivity (TFP). Output can be consumed
5C, invested in physical capital X, and invested in human capital E. Feasibility requires
C + X + E = Y . Physical capital is accumulated according to
K
0 = (1 − δ)K + AkX, Ak ≤ 1,
where Ak is a parameter determining the productivity of investment in physical capital (i.e.,
the eﬀectiveness with which current period output can be transformed into capital available
for production in the following period). The aggregate human capital H is given by the
sum of human capital services in the production of goods. Human capital of an individual is
produced with the inputs of time (s) and expenditures in human capital quality (e) according






1−ηξ η,ξ ∈ (0,1),
where z0 is a stochastic earnings (or learning) ability. Individuals are ex-ante identical in
their endowment of time but ex-post heterogeneous in their earnings ability. A unit of
schooling time (quantity of schooling) is produced with one unit of child’s time (s), and ¯ l
units of market human capital services. In other words, schooling requires own time and
time purchased in the market. Earnings ability is transmitted across generations according
to a discrete Markov transition matrix Q(z,z0), where qi,j = Pr(z0 = zi|z = zj). We abstract
from on-the-job human capital accumulation. In order to capture a realistic life-cycle proﬁle
of wages, we instead assume an exogenous path of life-cycle productivity (ψc,ψy,ψo) for
children, young adults, and old adults. The productivity of old children is normalized to
one. Our abstraction is motivated by tractability reasons as well as some empirical evidence
across countries. Using the coeﬃcients for returns to experience for each country reported in
Bils and Klenow (2000), we found that the earnings of a worker with 20 years of experience
relative to a worker with 10 years of experience is not systematically related to the level of
per-capita income across countries. In fact, we found a small negative correlation between
6returns to labor market experience (wage growth) and per-capita income across countries,
which suggests that on the job investments in human capital are not likely to be an important
source of income diﬀerences across countries.
Market structure We assume competitive markets for factor inputs and outputs. Firms






1−α − wH − (r + δ)K
	
. (2)
Public Education Since our calibration strategy is to use cross-sectional heterogeneity
within a country to restrict the parameters governing human capital accumulation, we cannot
abstract from the role of public education on education and labor market outcomes. We
model public education by assuming that education expenditures are subsidized at the rate
p per unit of schooling time. These expenditures are ﬁnanced with a proportional tax
τ on household’s income. Public and private expenditures are perfect substitutes in the
production of human capital.
Decision problem of the household All decisions of the household are made by the
parent. We assume that markets are imperfect in that households cannot perfectly insure
against labor-market risk and they cannot borrow. The state of a young parent is given by a
triple (z,h,q): earnings ability z, human capital h, and parental transfer q received from the
previous household in the dynasty line. Households maximize discounted lifetime utility of
all future generations in the dynasty. Young parents choose consumption cy, assets a0
y, time
spent in school by their children s (where 1−s is working time of the children), and resources
spent on the quality of education of their children e. A parent who provides his child with s
years of schooling and a quality of education e incurs expenditures of e+(w¯ l−p)s, where w¯ l
is a cost per year of education (which is assumed to depend on the market wage rate) and p
denotes public education expenditures (or subsidies) per year of education. We take a broad
7view of human capital and interpret the quality of education e as including non-education
expenditures (such as child-rearing and health care) that enhance future earnings of children.
Young parents face uncertainty regarding the ability of their children z0 which is realized in
the second stage of the household’s life cycle.
In the second stage, the household consists of a child with earnings wh0 and a parent
with earnings ψowh. Old parents decide savings for retirement a0
o, consumption co, and an
intergenerational transfer q0 for the next household in the dynasty. Retired people consume
their savings.
The decision problem of a young household can be written using the dynamic program-
























































0) ≥ 0, s ∈ [0,1],
where
Ev = [φ(U(cr) + v(z
0,h
0,q




The parameter φ is the probability of survival for a retired adult. Since old parents know
the ability of their children when making consumption, saving, and bequest decisions, these
8choices are expressed as contingent on their children’s ability z0 in the dynamic programming
problem of young parents.
3 Human capital investments in a complete markets
environment
This section provides some analytical results that shed light on how the parameters of the
human capital technology determine the quantitative implications of the theory. To this end,
we study two simpliﬁed versions of the model economy. In both speciﬁcations we assume
complete markets so that human capital investment decisions are independent of consump-
tion decisions. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation assumes a deterministic ability so that dynasties face no
uncertainty. We show that the parameters of the human capital technology that determine
earnings inequality in the economy (across individuals with diﬀerent ability) also determine
the income inequality across countries (with diﬀerent TFP). In particular, the quantitative
implications of the theory for income inequality − within and across countries − depend
crucially on the expenditure elasticity of human capital. We then show that our results ex-
tend to the complete markets economy with stochastic ability. Moreover, the cross-sectional
implications of the complete market economy provide valuable insights for calibrating the
benchmark economy with incomplete markets and for understanding the quantitative ﬁnd-
ings of the paper.
3.1 Deterministic ability
Consider a world with a large number of countries. Each country is populated by measure
1 of dynasties and is characterized by a ﬁxed TFP level A, which varies across countries
according to a cdf GA with a continuous density function. Each dynasty is characterized by
a ﬁxed ability level, which varies across dynasties according to a cdf Gz with a continuous
density function. Denote the variance of lnA and of lnz by σ2
A and σ2
z.
9Capital markets are assumed to be perfect so that in equilibrium individuals make eﬃcient
investments in human capital. The attention is conﬁned to the steady state analysis. The
equilibrium interest rate is given by the individuals rate of time preference ρ ≡ 1/β − 1.
Although the theory makes no predictions for the distribution of income, consumption, and
wealth, it does have important implications for the variation of schooling and earnings −
across individuals and countries − and for the variation of output across countries.
3.1.1 TFP elasticity of the aggregate income and human capital
We use the notation EXY to represent the elasticity of a variable X with respect to Y . Then
from (1) the elasticity of output with respect to TFP satisﬁes
EY A = 1 + αEKA + (1 − α)EHA. (4)




α−1 . The steady state ratio of aggre-





. Taking logs and





Note that a higher level of A increases capital through a higher capital to output ratio ( 1
1−α)
and through a higher human capital (EHA). Human capital thus ampliﬁes the direct eﬀect
of TFP on physical capital. Substitute (5) into (4), to obtain




The ﬁrst equality implies that the capital to output ratio is constant across countries and
the second equality shows that the TFP elasticity of output is determined by the response of
human capital accumulation (EHA). In order to obtain an expression for EHA, we ﬁrst study
10the decisions of individuals regarding human capital investments and we then aggregate the
behavior of individuals to obtain an aggregate elasticity.
3.1.2 Human capital investments across individuals and countries
Next we analyze how variation in wages and variation in ability leads to diﬀerent human
capital investments across countries (macro elasticity) and across individuals (micro elas-
ticity). Our goal is to isolate how the parameters of the human capital technology jointly
determine the micro and macro elasticities in our model.
First, evaluate the eﬀect of TFP on the equilibrium wage rate. Competitive markets




α , which using (5) gives EwA = 1 + α(EKA − EHA) = 1
1−α > 1.
TFP has a direct eﬀect on the wage rate and an indirect eﬀect through a higher physical to
human capital ratio. Next, consider the decision problem of an individual with ability z in
a country with a wage rate w. The human capital investment decision can be formulated as
choosing schooling time (s) and expenditures (e) to maximize the present value of lifetime




w(1 − s)hψ0 + whΨ − e − w¯ ls
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βiψi with ψi’s representing the life-cycle productivity parameters described
in the previous section, and β = 1
1+r provided r = ρ. The cost of schooling includes
expenditures in human capital quality (e), time-purchases on the market (tuition costs) per
unit of schooling time (w¯ l), and foregone earnings in the ﬁrst period of life (swhψ0).
Assuming an interior solution, the corresponding ﬁrst order conditions are:
−whψ0 + whs [(1 − s)ψ0 + Ψ] = w¯ l, (9)
whe [(1 − s)ψ0 + Ψ] = 1, (10)
11where hs = h
sηξ and he = h










[(1 − s)ψ0 + Ψ]

= ¯ l (11)
e =

wz (1 − η)ξ [(1 − s)ψ0 + Ψ]s
ηξ	 1
1−(1−η)ξ (12)
We are ready to analyze how individual decisions depend on the parameters of the maxi-
mization problem. In the absence of tuition costs (¯ l = 0), it is easy to solve for s from (11)
and verify that the optimal quantity of schooling does not vary across individuals (z) and
countries (w). We thus maintain ¯ l > 0. Similarly, if the absence of education expenditures
(η = 1), the quality of schooling does not vary across individuals and countries. On the
contrary, when 0 < η < 1, equations (11) and (12) imply that both quantity and quality of
schooling vary across individuals (z) and countries (w).
Proposition 1: The theory requires ¯ l > 0 and 0 < η < 1 in order to generate diﬀerences
in the quantity and quality of schooling across individuals (z) and countries (A).
To gain further insights using simple algebra, it is convenient to set ψ0 = 0. Then
combining (11) and (12), taking logs, and diﬀerentiating with respect to lnw, obtain the








The individual (ability) elasticity of schooling is obtained similarly, except the diﬀerentiation








The elasticity of expenditures with respect to the ability (z) and the wage rate (w) is

































3.1.3 From micro to macro elasticities
Building on the characterization of the individual decisions, we now focus on how changes
in TFP impact aggregate variables. That is, we want to go from Ehw to EHA.
We ﬁrst derive individual human capital elasticities. Log-diﬀerentiating (8) with respect









Using EhA = EhwEwA and EwA = 1








Since EhA does not vary across individuals, the aggregation is trivial: If two countries diﬀer





EhA . We thus conclude EHA = EhA. Table 2 summarizes the mapping from the model
parameters into the micro and macro elasticities.
We are now ready to explore the sensitivity of the TFP elasticity of human capital to
the parameters of the human capital technology. Since EhA increases with the returns to
scale parameter ξ and decreases with the time share parameter η, EhA increases with the
expenditure elasticity of human capital and is maximized when η = 0 and ξ = 1. As the
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For instance, if α = 1/3 and ξ = 0.9, EHA takes values between 0 and 15. Then (6) implies
that the TFP-elasticity of aggregate output is between 3/2 to 16.5, depending on the time
share parameter. In other words, a TFP ratio of 3 can generate diﬀerences in output per
worker anywhere from a factor of 5 to 74 million.4
Proposition 2: The ampliﬁcation eﬀect of human capital, given by (20), depends cru-
cially on the expenditure elasticity of human capital (1 − η)ξ. In particular, if the expenditure
share is zero (η = 1), then human capital does not amplify TFP diﬀerences across countries,
no matter how close ξ is to 1.
3.2 Stochastic ability
Now consider an economy where individual ability evolves stochastically. First, we show that
the ﬁndings of the previous section extend to the economy with stochatic ability. Second,
we derive some analytical relationships to motivate our calibration strategy. These ﬁndings
will illuminate the quantitative results for the benchmark economy we obtain later on.
4While EhA is determined both by η and ξ, note that the expenditure elasticity alone provides a lower
bound to the ampliﬁcation eﬀect. This is because η ≥ 0 implies (1 − η)ξ ≤ ξ, which together with (20) and







. On the other hand, the parameter ξ implies an upper bound
for EhA since EhA varies from 0 to 1
1−α
ξ
1−ξ for all feasible values of η.
14Assume that ability is correlated across individuals in a dynasty according to a transition
function Q(z0,z), where z0 denotes the ability of the parent and z the ability of the children.
Individuals make investment decisions before knowing the realization of a random ability
shock z, which is distributed according to the probability measure Q(z0,·).
Given that individuals can fully diversify all risk, the human capital investment deci-
sion can be separated from the consumption decisions. Individuals maximize the expected
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Q(z0,dz) (21)
subject to (8) and given z0. Deﬁne the conditional expectations of ability g(z0) ≡
R
zQ(z0,dz)
and human capital ˆ h ≡ g(z0)(sηe1−η)
ξ. Substitution of these functions into (21) makes the
optimization problem for the stochastic economy identical to problem (7) for the determin-
istic economy, provided z = g(z0).5 Thus, in the presence of uncertainty, optimal investment
decisions depend on the conditional expectations of ability, g(z0), instead of the realized
ability z, but are otherwise identical to the economy with deterministic ability.
It follows that the elasticities of schooling time and expenditure with respect to wages
and expected ability are also the same as in the deterministic economy (equations (13),(14),
(17) and (16) hold). Moreover, schooling time and expenditures can be expressed as






where cs and ce are independent of (z0,w). Combining (22), (23), (8) and the expressions
in Table 2 for (Esz,Esw,Eez,Eew), obtain the human capital of an individual with parental
5The objective function in (21) becomes
n
w(1 − s)ˆ hψ0 + wˆ hΨ − e − w¯ ls
o
15ability z0, which is a random variable given by





where ch is a constant (independent of z0,z, and w) and z is a random draw from the
probability measure Q(z0,·). It follows that the wage elasticity of human capital is also
identical to the one in the deterministic economy: Ehw =
(1−η)ξ
1−ξ . We thus conclude that,
as in the deterministic economy, the ampliﬁcation of the TFP diﬀerences across countries is
driven by the expenditure elasticity of human capital, i.e. Proposition 2 also holds in the
stochastic-ability economy.
3.2.1 The human capital technology and the cross-sectional restrictions of the
theory
Our results suggest that it is crucial to discipline the selection of parameters of the human
capital technology. Note that these parameters (η,ξ) cannot be calibrated independently
from the stochastic process for ability (z) since they jointly determine the implications of
the theory (see (22) and (24)). In brief, our calibration will target data for the United States:
cross-sectional evidence on schooling and earnings and the aggregate share of goods in the
costs of education. Our approach of calibrating to the U.S. data rather than to the cross-
country data is motivated by the fact that countries may diﬀer in other dimensions beside
the TFP, such as public policy, which inﬂuence education decisions. In addition, we want to
impose discipline on the parameters of the human capital technology using data other than
the cross-country data for which the model has implications.
In motivating the calibration strategy, discussed in detail in the next section, it is useful to
look at the cross-sectional implications of the complete markets model. To this end, suppose
ability is not correlated across generations (i.e. ability is a random iid draw). In this case,
the expected ability g(z0) does not vary across individuals, and hence (22) implies no cross-
16sectional variation in schooling. Thus, ability shocks need to be serially correlated for the
theory to be consistent with the cross-sectional evidence on schooling. Moreover, if ability
shocks were perfectly correlated across generations, then z = g(z0) = z0 and (24) implies
that there is no variation in earnings across individuals with the same level of schooling. To
sum up, ability shocks need to be imperfectly correlated across generations for the theory to
be consistent with the cross-sectional evidence on schooling and earnings.
To understand how earnings vary with the expected ability, integrate (24) with respect
to Q(z0,·) to obtain the average human capital of individuals with the expected ability g(z0)
and, hence, with the same level of schooling,












g(z) denotes the cross-sectional variance of the expected ability. Two important
observations are immediate from this expression: First, the variation in earnings increases
with ξ − the returns to scale in the human capital technology. Second, the variance in
earnings is independent of the time share parameter η.
The latter observation is useful for understanding some experiments that we conduct
in the next section of the paper. In these experiments we perform a sensitivity analysis
that consists of varying the target for the share of time inputs in the aggregate cost of
education and recalibrating the model economy. In this way we obtain alternative calibrated
model economies that diﬀer in the time share parameter. As we later conﬁrm, all the model
economies match the calibration targets well. We shall thus conclude that the identiﬁcation
of the time share parameter comes primarily from the target for the share of time inputs in
the aggregate cost of education and not from the cross-sectional restrictions of the theory,
which is consistent with the second observation made above.
It is also interesting to evaluate the complete markets economy in terms of its predictions
17for the quality of immigrants by country of origin. Consider an economy that has a large
number of immigrants born in two countries that diﬀer in their TFP. We assume that,
conditional on a schooling level, immigration is a random draw from the population in each
of the countries, and that immigrants were educated in their country of origin. Denote the














Using (25) and (26), the ratio of the average human capital for the two groups of immigrants
satisﬁes
















That is, the theory predicts that the quality of immigrants does not change with the per
capita income of the immigrant’s country of origin − a prediction that is inconsistent with the
evidence in Borjas (1997). We will later show that our benchmark economy with incomplete
markets makes a successful step toward replicating Borjas’ ﬁndings, and the degree of the
success is determined by the time share parameter.
Next, we show that variation in the average years of schooling across countries is closely
tied to the expenditure share in the human capital technology. Integrate (22) over Gz and
take logs to obtain ln
R
s(z,w) Gz(dz) = cw+Esw lnw = cw+
(1−η)ξ
1−ξ lnw, for some constant cw.
Notice that lnw = cy +
1−ξ








Thus, the schooling-income elasticity across countries is equal to
(1−η)ξ
1−ηξ , which is a decreasing
function of the time share parameter η. In the next section, we will show that this ﬁnding
extends to the benchmark economy with incomplete markets: the cross-country schooling
6This expression is obtained as follows: First, EwA = 1
1−α implies lnw = cw + 1
1−α lnA, for some c.
Second, EY A = 1
1−α
1−ηξ




18elasticity with respect to income declines with η.
Proposition 3: The economy with stochastic abilities and complete markets exhibits the
same TFP elasticities of output, human capital, and schooling as the deterministic economy.
The cross-sectional variances of earnings and schooling are driven by the stochastic process
on ability and the returns to scale in the human capital technology. In particular, the time
share parameter does not have consequences for the cross-sectional variances. The complete
market economy counterfactually predicts that the quality of immigrants is independent of
the per capita income of the immigrant’s country of origin.
3.3 Relative productivity in the investment sector
We now assume that countries diﬀer in the relative productivity of the investment sector. To
this end, assume that the production of investment goods requires the use of a technology
that converts the consumption good into the investment good. Denoting the TFP in the
investment good sector by Ak, we have Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + AkXt, where Xt is the gross
investment in period t. It is easy to see that Ak determines the steady-state ratio of physical
capital to human capital and, thus, the long run wage rate in the economy. Note that
one unit of consumption can be transformed into Ak units of capital which in turn can be
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19Then the ampliﬁer eﬀect of the producitivity diﬀerences in the investment sector on human
capital diﬀerences across countries is determined by the elasticity EhAk = EhwEwAk, where
Ehw is given by (18) and EwAk − by (28).
Proposition 4: Assume that countries diﬀer in the relative productivity of the investment
good sector. The ampliﬁcation eﬀect of human capital accumulation is driven by the wage
elasticity of human capital.
4 Calibration
As discussed in the previous section, the aggregate implications of TFP diﬀerences across
countries in our model hinge on the parameters determining human capital accumulation.
Our calibration strategy is to restrict these parameters using cross-sectional heterogeneity
of schooling and earnings in the data for the United States.
4.1 Parameters and targets
We calibrate our benchmark economy to data for the United States. The model period is 16
years. Because we are interested in comparisons across countries, the level of technology in
the benchmark economy is eﬀectively a normalization. Therefore, we set A = Ak = 1. The
mapping between parameters and targets in the data is multidimensional, and we thus solve
for parameter values jointly. We divide the discussion of calibration into parameters that
relate to preferences, demographics, and production of goods and parameters that relate to
human capital accumulation. A summary of parameter values and data targets is provided
in Table 3.
Preferences, demographics, and production of goods We set the relative-risk-aversion
parameter σ to 2. There is not a direct empirical counterpart for this parameter in the em-
pirical literature since our model period is 16 years and there is an inﬁnite inter-temporal
20Table 3: Parameters and Data Targets
Parameter Value Target U.S. Model
CRRA σ 2 Empirical literature − −
Discount factor β1/16 0.94 Interest rate (%) 5 5
Survival probability φ 0.4 Life expectancy at birth (years) 76 76
Capital share α 0.33 Capital income share 0.33 0.33
Annual depreciation δ 0.07 Investment to output 0.2 0.2
H.C. time share η 0.66 Share of labor in total ed. cost 0.9 0.9
H.C. RTS ξ 0.79 Mincer returns to schooling (%) 10 10
Schooling cost ¯ l 0.89 Average years of schooling 12.9 12.9
Tax rate on income τ 0.039 Public Education (% of GDP) 3.9 3.9
Child’s productivity ψc 0.13 Percentage with college degree 24 24
Young adult’s productivity ψy 1.4 Relative earnings 1.4 1.4
Old adult’s productivity ψo 1.08 Relative earnings 1.57 1.57
Ability variance σz (0.51)2 VAR(log-earnings) 0.36 0.36
Ability correlation ρz 0.17 CORR(log-earnings) 0.5 0.5
substitution of consumption within a period. However, we view a value of σ that is in the
range of values considered in quantitative studies with heterogeneous agents. (See Keane
and Wolpin (2001) and Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) for discussions of these estimates.) The
discount factor β is set to target an annual interest rate of 5 percent which is roughly the
return on capital in the U.S. economy (see Poterba (1997)).7 In our model, retired adults
live up to the age of 85. The National Center for Health Statistics (2004) reports that in
1990 the average life expectancy at birth in the United States was 76 years. Therefore, we
calibrate the probability of survival for retired adults (φ) to 0.4 so that the life expectancy at
birth in our model matches 76 years. The capital-share parameter is set to 0.33, consistent
with the capital income share in the U.S. economy from the National Income and Products
Accounts. The depreciation rate δ is selected to match an investment to output ratio of 20
percent as documented in the Economic Report of the President (2004).8
7Average return on non-ﬁnancial corporate capital net of taxes in 1990-96.
8We obtain a similar target if instead we take the average of the investment to output ratio in the PWT6.1
for the period 1990 to 1996, see Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).
21Human capital accumulation Recall that the human capital technology is given by
h0 = z0 (sηe1−η)
ξ, where s denotes schooling time and e denotes educational expenditures.
We need to specify two elasticity parameters: η and ξ. Ability follows an AR(1) process (in
logs):
log(z
0) = ρz log(z) + z,
where z ∼ N(0,σz). In our computations, we approximate this stochastic process with a
discrete ﬁrst-order Markov chain that takes 7 possible values for ability z. We use the approx-
imation procedure in Tauchen (1986) to compute transition probabilities. This procedure
involves selecting two additional parameter values: ρz and σz. There are ﬁve additional
parameters aﬀecting human capital accumulation: Schooling cost ¯ l, tax rate on income τ
(that in equilibrium determines public education subsidies p), and life-cycle productivity
parameters (ψc,ψy,ψo), setting the relative labor earnings of children, young adults, and
old adults. Our calibration procedure restricts the values of these 9 parameters so that the
equilibrium of the model matches the following 9 targets from the U.S. data:
1. Intergenerational correlation of log-earnings of 0.5 from Mulligan (1997). (See also
excellent surveys of the empirical literature on the intergenerational correlation of
earnings by Stokey (1998) and Solon (1999))
2. Variance of log permanent earnings of 0.36 (see Mulligan (1997, 1999))
3. Average years of schooling of 12.9 from the U.S. Department of Education (2004) in
1990. (See also Barro and Lee (1996).)
4. Fraction of individuals with a college degree or more of 24 percent from the Historical
Tables of the U.S. Census Bureau (2004).
5. Public education expenditures as a fraction of GDP of 3.9 percent from the Statistical
Abstract of the United States (1999). In computing this statistic in the data, we
treat as public expenditures all state and federal expenditures. We exclude public
22local expenditures in education because these expenditures are closely tied to property
values and therefore to the income of parents. (See Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) for
a discussion.)
6. The ratio of earnings for full-time, year-round workers of ages 35-54 to ages 25-34 of
1.40 in 2003 from the U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables.
7. The ratio of earnings for full-time, year-round workers of ages 55-64 to ages 25-34 of
1.57 in 2003 from the U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables.
8. Mincer returns to schooling of 10 percent. Heckman et al. (2005) report a Mincer
return of between 10 to 13 percent during the period 1980 to 1990. Psacharopoulos
(1994) estimates a Mincer return of 10 percent for the United States for the period
1990-95. Because Psacharopoulos also provides data on Mincer returns for a large set
of countries, we follow Bils and Klenow (2000) in using Psacharopoulos’ estimate for
the U.S. economy. In the benchmark economy, we measure returns to education by
regressing log-wages on years of education:
log(wh
0
i) = b0 + b1 (16si) + ui,
where b1 gives the Mincer return.
9. The share of labor inputs in the total cost of investment in education of 90 percent
according to Kendrick (1976) and the U.S. Department of Education (1996).
4.2 The benchmark economy
The benchmark economy matches all the calibration targets well (see Table 3). In particular,
it successfully replicates the U.S. cross-sectional data on schooling (Mincer return, average
years of schooling, fraction of college-educated individuals), earnings (variance and intergen-
erational correlation of earnings), and the share of labor inputs in total education costs. We
23now show that the model is consistent with several dimensions of heterogeneity in the data
that were not targeted in the calibration. We conclude that the model is a good quantitative
theory of within-country heterogeneity.
Distribution of Schooling According to the U.S. Department of Education (2004) the
proportion of people in 1990 between 25 and 34 years of age (all sexes and races) with
primary schooling (1st to 8th grade) as their highest education attainment was 4 percent,
with secondary schooling (9th to 12th grade) − 50 percent, and with college education (4
years of college or more) − 24 percent. Our model matches these statistics reasonably well
as documented in Table 4.9
Table 4: Education and Earnings − Model and Data
Schooling Dist. Rel. Earnings Mincer Ret.(%)
Model Data Model Data Model Data
Primary 0.08 0.04 0.66 0.62 15.6 21.8
Secondary 0.28 0.50 1.00 1.00 9.3 11.5
College 0.24 0.24 1.78 1.70 10.3 9.6
Mincer returns data from Willis (1986).
Schooling and earnings The benchmark economy matches the joint distribution of earn-
ings and schooling in the data well. According to the U.S. Department of Education (2004),
in 1998 males in the U.S. with college education earn (on average) 70 percent more than
high-school graduates. This earning ratio is 1.78 in the benchmark economy. Similarly, the
earnings ratio between individual with primary education and secondary education is .62 in
the U.S. data and it is .66 in the model economy (see Table 4). Recall that the the calibration
targeted the average Mincer returns to education. Nonetheless, the benchmark economy is
also consistent with the fact that in the data Mincer returns are substantially higher at low
9We note, however, that time in school is a continuous variable in our model, making its comparison
with the data non trivial. In particular, the distribution of schooling in the data has clear spikes at levels of
education where an educational degree is completed.
24levels of schooling. In the benchmark economy and in the U.S. data, earnings vary not only
across individuals with diﬀerent years of schooling but also across individuals with the same
level of schooling. To evaluate the importance of earnings inequality within schooling groups
in the benchmark economy, we simulate individual level data on schooling and earnings. We
then regress log earnings on schooling years and obtain an R2 of only 26.5 percent. Thus, the
regression results imply that schooling accounts for a low fraction of the variance in earnings
across individuals which is consistent with the ﬁndings in the labor literature for the United
States (see for instance Neal and Johnson (1996)).
Expenditures on education The share of GDP spent on education increases with the
returns to scale parameter in the human capital production function as discussed in our
calibration section. In light of that discussion, it is interesting to compare the proportion
of GDP in the form of educational expenditures in our model with the data. Haveman and
Wolfe (1995) report that expenditures on children aged 0-18 are as large as 14.5 percent of
GDP. This share includes not only public investment, but also private costs, such as food,
housing, transportation and foregone parental earnings in child care. When we exclude
foregone parental earnings from Haveman and Wolfe’s numbers we obtain 12.6 percent. In
our model, total education expenditures correspond to (e+w¯ ls) aggregated over all people.
In the benchmark economy and using this formula, total expenditures on education amount
to 12 percent of GDP, a ﬁgure close to Haveman and Wolfe’s estimate.
5 Quantitative results
We use our quantitative theory to assess the aggregate and distributional consequences of
TFP diﬀerences across countries. Changes in TFP aﬀect human capital accumulation since
human capital investment requires goods in our calibrated model economy (see the discussion
in Section 3). The question we address in this section is about the quantitative magnitude of
this eﬀect. We ﬁnd that TFP has a large eﬀect on human capital accumulation and output
25even though goods represent only a small proportion of the total cost of education in our
benchmark economy (around 10 percent).
5.1 Aggregate implications
We assume that countries are identical in terms of preferences and technologies except for
their level of TFP in the production of goods. Then, by construction, all cross-country
diﬀerences in output per worker in our model are generated by diﬀerences in TFP. Since TFP
has an indirect eﬀect on output per worker through factor accumulation, we investigate the
degree to which the impact of TFP on output per worker is ampliﬁed by factor accumulation
and the relative contribution of physical and human capital accumulation. To illustrate the
magnitude of this ampliﬁcation eﬀect we compare aggregate statistics from these economies.
Relative to the benchmark economy, economies with relative TFP levels of 1/2 and 1/3
exhibit relative output per worker of 1/6 and 1/21 and relative human capital of 1/3 and
1/4. Low relative TFP leads to low average years of schooling and high Mincer return. In
Table 5 we compare summary aggregate statistics for economies that diﬀer in their TFP.
Table 5: Aggregate Implications of TFP Diﬀerences in the Model
Relative TFP (A) 1 1/2 1/3
Rel. Y 1 1/6 1/21
Rel. H 1 1/3 1/4
K/Y 2.8 2.7 2.7
Average Years of Schooling 12.9 7.1 4.3
Returns to Schooling (%) 10.0 14.5 22.6
Ampliﬁcation eﬀect Unlike the results in Section 3, the TFP ampliﬁcation eﬀect in the
benchmark economy cannot be characterized with an analytical expression. However, there
is a simple way of measuring it using the simulated cross-country data. First, note that
changes in TFP induce a linear relationship (with slope equal to 1) between log output and
log physical capital. This result is a consequence of the fact that in Bewley-type economies
26(dynastic economies with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk), the equilibrium interest rate is close
to the rate of time preference (see for instance Aiyagari (1994) and Fuster (2000)). As a
result, in equilibrium the marginal product of capital is close to the rate of time preference




k ≈ ρ + δ. Using this relationship to solve
for k as a function of output we obtain k = cky for some constant ck. Second, as indicated in
Figure 1, the model implies a linear relationship between log human capital and log output
as TFP varies across economies, but the slope of this relationship is less than one. Using this
observation, we write human capital as a function of output as log(h) = ch +γ log(y), which
implies that h = exp(ch)yγ. Substituting the expressions derived for k and h (in terms of y)




for some constant cy. Then, the TFP elasticity of output per worker in our model is 1
(1−α)(1−γ).
In the benchmark economy, α = 0.33 and γ = 0.46 (as indicated by the slope coeﬃcient in
Figure 1). As a result, the TFP elasticity of output per worker is equal to 2.77. It follows
that if TFP diﬀers by a factor of 2 between two economies, the model implies that their
output per worker would diﬀer by a factor of 22.77 = 6.8. Another way of expressing this
result is to compute the TFP diﬀerences required in the model to generate a given diﬀerence
in output per worker between two countries. From equation (29), the ratio of output per










Using an elasticity of 2.77 from our previous calculations, it follows that an output ratio of
20 can be generated by a TFP ratio of 2.94. We thus conclude that our calibrated model
implies a large ampliﬁcation eﬀect of TFP diﬀerences across countries. Moreover, we note
that the ampliﬁcation eﬀect provided by physical capital is 1
1−α = 1.49 and the one provided
27by human capital is 1
1−γ = 1.85. Human capital thus represents an important source of
ampliﬁcation.
Human capital and mincer returns To the extent that schooling quality aﬀects the
intercept term in a Mincer regression (as discussed in Section 2), the use of estimated Mincer
returns to measure human capital stocks across countries may underestimate diﬀerences in
human capital across countries. Since Mincer returns are frequently used to measure human
capital in growth accounting exercises, it is of interest to assess the importance of this
bias using our calibrated model economy. To this end, we use Mincer returns to measure
human capital across model economies that diﬀer in their TFP levels. We consider country-
speciﬁc Mincer returns and allow each year of schooling to have a diﬀerent return, depending
on whether the year of schooling corresponds to primary, secondary, or college education.
We add across people using the population share in each schooling category to obtain an
aggregate measure of human capital per worker. We report results in Table 6. Whereas
the economy with relative TFP of 1/3 has a human capital equal to 0.25 (relative to the
benchmark economy), the Mincer measure would imply a human capital of 0.5 (half the
diﬀerence in our model). We conclude that Mincer returns underestimate human capital
diﬀerences across countries by a large margin.
Table 6: Human Capital across Economies
Relative TFP 1 1/2 1/3
(1) Human Capital Ratio 1 0.45 0.25
(2) Mincer H.C. Ratio 1 0.69 0.51
Ratio of (2) to (1) 1 1.5 2.0
Schooling quality Our quantitative theory implies that schooling quality is important
for understanding diﬀerences in human capital and output per worker across countries. This
result raises the question: Are the schooling-quality diﬀerences implied by our theory reason-
able? While there are no reliable cross-country measures of schooling quality, the literature
28has used the empirical evidence on earnings of immigrants as an indirect approach to mea-
suring human capital diﬀerences across countries. Therefore, it is of interest to compare
our ﬁndings with those of Borjas (1987). Looking at immigrant wages in the United States,
Borjas estimates that, on average, the wage that a worker with a given amount of educa-
tion earns in the United States is 0.12 percent higher when the income per person in the
immigrant’s country of origin is 1 percent higher.
Table 7 shows that the average earnings of a person in the benchmark economy is between
3.5 and 4 times the average earnings of a similar worker in the economy with relative TFP
level of 1/2 (depending on the schooling level of the person) and it is more than 7 times
the earnings of an equally educated worker in a country with relative TFP level of 1/3.
The earnings ratio is largest for people with primary education. The bulk of cross-country
earnings diﬀerences can be attributed to diﬀerences in relative prices. If a person from the
economy with relative TFP of 1/2 were to migrate to the benchmark economy, the wage rate
of this person would increase by a factor of 2.8. If the immigrant comes from an economy
with relative TFP of 1/3, his wage rate would increase by a factor of 5.2. Our model
is thus consistent with the observed migration pressures from poor to rich countries. On
average, immigrants in the benchmark economy would not earn the same as natives with the
same school years because of the diﬀerences in the quality of schooling (as captured by the
expenditure on education goods). Native workers with primary and college education in the
benchmark economy earn between 20 to 40 percent more than potential immigrants with
same level of schooling and born in the economy with relative TFP of 1/2. The information
in Table 7 can be used to obtain an estimate of the income elasticity of schooling quality (by









where H1 and Y1 stand for human capital and per capita income in the benchmark economy
29(relative TFP of 1) and j represents a country with relative TFP of j. When considering
potential immigrants with secondary education from economies with relative TFP of 1/2
and 1/3, we obtain schooling-quality elasticities between 0.10 and 0.11 which are close to
the 0.12 estimate in Borjas (1987).
Table 7: Quality of Education
Education Level Earnings Ratio∗ Wage Ratio∗ Quality Ratio∗ Elasticity
Panel A: relative TFP= 1/2
Primary 4.0 2.8 1.4 0.18
Secondary 3.5 2.8 1.2 0.10
Some college 3.5 2.8 1.2 0.10
Panel B: relative TFP= 1/3
Primary 10.6 5.2 2.0 0.23
Secondary 7.4 5.2 1.4 0.11
Some college 7.1 5.2 1.4 0.11
∗Ratio of benchmark economy to economies with relative TFP of 1/2 and 1/3.
Ampliﬁcation eﬀect with eﬃcient investments Due to incomplete markets, invest-
ments in human capital are not necessarily eﬃcient in the benchmark economy. It is possible
that investments are more ineﬃcient in poor countries relative to rich. To what extent is
the large TFP ampliﬁcation eﬀect in the benchmark economy driven by the market incom-
pleteness? To assess the role of ineﬃcient investments, we consider a complete markets
counterpart of the benchmark economy, as described in section 3.2. We then evaluate the
quantitative impact of changing TFP in this economy with eﬃcient investments. We ﬁnd
that the TFP elasticity of output is 2.85, which is close to 2.77 found for the benchmark econ-
omy. Thus, the large ampliﬁcation eﬀect is driven by the TFP eﬀect on the relative prices
of the human capital inputs and not by the ineﬃciency of investments in poor countries.
305.2 Sensitivity analysis
Our baseline calibration targeted an expenditure share of time inputs of 90 percent as re-
ported by Kendrick (1976). We acknowledge that, despite Kendrick’s careful analysis, it may
be diﬃcult to accurately measure inputs into human capital accumulation. Since the magni-
tude of our quantitative results hinge on the importance of time inputs, a sensitivity analysis
along this dimension is warranted.10 To this end, we consider three alternative calibrations
to our benchmark economy. In all the calibrated economies, we maintain the calibration
targets of our benchmark economy except for the share of time inputs in education costs,
which we set at 85, 95, and 100 percent (instead of 90 percent in the baseline calibration).
Our goal is to evaluate the eﬀects of TFP under diﬀerent assumptions about the importance
of time inputs in human capital accumulation. We then use data to discriminate among the
alternative speciﬁcations.
The three calibrated model economies do as well as the benchmark economy in matching
the targets discussed in section 4 (see Table 3).11 In other words, all the economies match the
data targets well, including the distributional statistics. Therefore, the economies considered
are equally good quantitative theories of the U.S. income distribution (as we have anticipated
in Section 3). However, there are a number of dimensions where these economies perform
diﬀerently. We discuss these diﬀerences in detail.
To start, we compute the TFP elasticity of output per worker in each of the calibrated
model economies and report the results in Table 8. When human capital requires only time
inputs, physical capital is the only source of ampliﬁcation, and it implies a TFP elasticity of
1.49. When the share of time inputs is 95 percent, the TFP elasticity of income is 1.84. This
statistic increases to 2.8 in our baseline calibration and to 3.63 when time inputs represent
85 percent. Given these elasticity estimates, the ampliﬁcation eﬀect of TFP diﬀerences
10There is a related discussion in the taxation literature where the tax eﬀect on human capital accumulation
hinges on the importance of goods in the production of human capital. For instance, see Trostel (1993) and
Davies and Whalley (1989).
11The parameter values needed to match the targets are available from the authors upon request.
31varies substantially across economies. A factor of 3 diﬀerence in TFP implies a factor of 5.1
diﬀerence in output per worker in the speciﬁcation with no goods inputs, whereas it implies
a factor of 54 diﬀerence in output per worker when the share of time inputs is 85 percent.
To put it diﬀerently, the TFP ratio needed to generate an output ratio of 20 between two
economies is 7.5 in the time-only economy, 2.9 in the baseline calibration, and 2.3 when time
inputs are 85 percent.
Table 8: Time Share and Ampliﬁcation
Time-share Target (%)
100 95 90 85
TFP Elasticity 1.49 1.84 2.77 3.63
Output Ratio 5.1 7.6 20.8 54.0
TFP Ratio 7.5 5.1 2.9 2.3
Schooling-Quality Elasticity:
Primary 0 0.08 0.18 0.30
Secondary 0 0.07 0.10 0.16
Given a TFP elasticity of output per worker, the output ratio is
the one implied by a factor of 3 diﬀerence in TFP, and the TFP
ratio is the one required to produce a factor of 20 diﬀerence in
output per worker. The schooling-quality elasticity is computed
using data for the economies with relative TFP of 1 and 1/2.
We discriminate among the calibrated model economies as follows. For each of the
speciﬁcations, we obtain observations for average years of schooling and output per worker
by simulating economies that vary in their relative levels of TFP. In Figure 2, we plot
cross-country data on schooling and income, taken from Barro and Lee (1996) and Heston,
Summers, and Aten (2002), together with data generated by simulating the calibrated model
economies. We ﬁnd that the speciﬁcation with a time share of 100 percent implies that
average years of schooling do not vary with income, an implication that is at odds with the
cross-country data. Intuitively, when human capital only requires time inputs, a change in
TFP aﬀects equally the beneﬁts and costs of human capital accumulation. When human
capital requires goods, however, an increase in TFP increases the beneﬁts proportionally
32more than the costs of human capital accumulation, leading to an increase in the average
years of schooling. Figure 2 also reveals that our baseline calibration (time share of 90
percent) does a good job of reproducing the observed pattern between schooling and income
across countries. The economy with a time share of 85 percent also does a good job of
reproducing this pattern.
In Figure 3, we plot cross-country data on Mincer returns and schooling, as reported
in Psacharopoulos (1994). Note that Mincer returns tend to be low in countries with high
average years of schooling. Our simulations reveal that goods inputs in human capital
are needed to match the negative association between average years of schooling and Mincer
returns across countries. Our baseline calibration does a good job of reproducing the pattern
in the data. However, the economies with a time share of 85 and 95 percent also do a good
job of reproducing this pattern. The time-only model implies that average years of schooling
and Mincer returns do not vary across economies, an implication that is inconsistent with
the cross-country data.
Goods inputs in human capital accumulation are also necessary for generating schooling-
quality diﬀerences across countries. Since in the time-only economy there are no cross-
country diﬀerences in schooling quality, potential immigrants would earn the same amount
as natives regardless of their country of origin, an implication that is inconsistent with the
empirical ﬁndings of Borjas (1987) and Hendricks (2002) on the relative earnings of immi-
grants. Recall that, using data from immigrants, Borjas estimated an income elasticity of
schooling quality of 0.12. Table 8 reveals that the speciﬁcation with a time share of 95
percent generates too little cross-country diﬀerences in schooling quality relative to Borjas’
estimate. In this economy, the schooling-quality elasticity for people with secondary educa-
tion is 0.07, which is substantially lower than the 0.12 value estimated by Borjas.12 In our
baseline calibration, with a time share of 90 percent, the schooling elasticity of income for
people with secondary education is 0.10, a value close to the 0.12 estimate. When the time
12Recall that most immigrants in the United States have a higher level of education than primary education.
33share is 85 percent, the schooling elasticity of income is 0.16. Overall, we conclude that the
data seems to be consistent with a time share closer to 90 percent than to 85 or 95 percent.
5.3 Literature discussion
We discuss our ﬁndings relative to important papers in the literature. In particular, we
relate our results with those of Bils and Klenow (2000) [hereafter BK], Mankiw, Romer, and
Weil (1992) [hereafter MRW], Manuelli and Seshadri (2005) [hereafter MS], and Hendricks
(2002).
BK argue that MRW may have overstated the importance of human capital in accounting
for cross-country income diﬀerences by focusing on a one-sector model with no distinction
between the production of goods and human capital. Since, according to Kendrick (1976)
study, time inputs represent 90 percent of the total costs of human capital accumulation,
BK consider a two-sector model in which the production of human capital only requires time
inputs. Given that in fact education does require some goods (such as computers, books,
buildings, paper, and pencils) the following question arises: Is it important to take goods
inputs into account when evaluating the consequences of TFP diﬀerences across countries?
Our ﬁndings could not be more striking. By calibrating our benchmark economy to the
estimates in Kendrick (1976), with goods accounting for only 10 percent of the cost of human
capital investment, we ﬁnd that human capital still implies a large ampliﬁcation eﬀect of
TFP diﬀerences across countries. In fact, the ampliﬁcation eﬀect in our model is larger than
the one implied in MRW.
MRW consider a one-sector growth model with Y = C + IK + IH = AKαHβL1−α−β,
where α = 0.30 and β = 0.28. Then, the ratio of output per worker across countries diﬀering






















34where the subscripts h and l stand for high and low TFP. In MRW, diﬀerences in TFP are
ampliﬁed by a factor of 1
1−α−β = 1
1−0.30−0.28 = 2.38. Thus, the ampliﬁcation eﬀect in our
baseline calibration is 16 percent larger than the one implied by MRW. This ﬁnding may
seem paradoxical: While MRW advocate that factor accumulation can account for most of
the cross-country income diﬀerences, we ﬁnd that TFP diﬀerences of a factor of 3 are needed
for explaining the large variation of per capita income across countries. How can we reconcile
these ﬁndings? The explanation is, as pointed by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), that
MRW overstate the cross-country variation in human capital when doing their accounting
exercise.13
MS use a calibrated model economy to evaluate the importance of human capital for
understanding cross-country income diﬀerences. Their approach diﬀers from ours in that
they use a representative-agent life-cycle model. They assume that all wage growth over the
life cycle is due to investment in human capital rather than capital deepening or technological
progress. They calibrate the parameters of the human capital technology to match the age
proﬁle of wages in the data. This produces a TFP elasticity of output per worker of 6.6, which
is substantially larger than the 2.77 elasticity in our baseline calibration. 14 The discrepancy
between these elasticities is not minor: While MS ﬁnd that factor of 20 diﬀerences in output
per worker can be explained with a TFP diﬀerence of 60 percent, our results point to a
TFP diﬀerence of 200 percent. Alternatively, an ampliﬁcation eﬀect of 2.77 in our baseline
calibration implies that an annual rate of TFP growth of 0.65 percent accounts for the post-
war output growth in the United States (about 1.8 percent a year), whereas the ampliﬁcation
eﬀect found by MS requires a much lower annual rate of technological progress (0.27 percent).
The sensitivity analysis in section 5.2 reveals that the model economy calibrated to a
time-share target in the range of 90 to 85 percent can account for the cross-country evidence
13Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) argue that primary enrollment rates vary much less across countries
than secondary enrollment rates. Thus, by using secondary enrollment as a measure of human capital
investment, MRW overstate the variance of human capital across countries.
14Manuelli and Seshadri (2005) report a TFP elasticity of output per worker of 9 when both TFP and
demographic factors are allowed to vary across countries. We estimate the elasticity to be 6.6 when demo-
graphic factors are kept constant to U.S. levels using the results in Table 4, page 24.
35on schooling and income, the cross-country evidence on Mincer returns to schooling, and
is consistent with evidence on immigrant’s earnings from Borjas (1987). It follows that an
ampliﬁcation eﬀect of relative TFP diﬀerences in the range from 2.77 to 3.6 is plausible and
that the cross-country variation in output per worker can be explained with relative TFP
diﬀerences in the range from 2.3 to 3. In a closely related study that follows a diﬀerent
methodology from ours, Hendricks (2002) also concludes that TFP diﬀerences of a factor of
3 are needed to account for the cross-country data. Hendricks performs a growth account-
ing exercise without assuming a speciﬁc functional form for human capital accumulation by
directly measuring cross-country diﬀerences in school quality using data on relative earnings
(adjusted by schooling levels) of immigrants in the United States. To generate compara-
ble statistics from our model, we simulate immigrants from four potential source countries
diﬀering with respect to their TFP. For each source country, we select immigrants with an
average level of schooling consistent with the data reported in Hendricks. We assume that,
conditional on the level of schooling, immigrants are randomly drawn from the distribution
of ability types in the source country. We ﬁnd that an immigrant from a country with an
income in the range of 10 to 20 percent of U.S. income, has relative earnings of about 84
percent of a similarly schooled U.S. worker, which is close to the value of 83 percent reported
by Hendricks (see Figure 4).
We conclude that our benchmark economy is roughly consistent with Hendrick’s data.
Importantly, the economy with a time share of 85 percent implies relative earnings of immi-
grants that are too low compared to the data (see fourth panel in Figure 4). One interpreta-
tion of this result is that this economy generates diﬀerences in the quality of human capital
that are too large compared to the data. An alternative interpretation is that the assumption
that immigrants are randomly drawn from the talent distribution (conditional on schooling
levels) is not correct. Instead, if immigrants are positively selected, the implications of the
model economy with a time share of 85 percent could well be consistent with the data.
Nevertheless, this economy would imply an ampliﬁcation eﬀect of 3.6, which is still substan-
36tially below the value of 6.6 found by MS. An ampliﬁcation eﬀect of 6.6 would obviously
imply much larger quality diﬀerences in schooling across countries than the ones obtained
in our baseline calibration. We thus side with Hendricks in concluding that accounting for
the observed cross-country income diﬀerences on the basis of human and physical capital
alone would require implausibly large degrees of self-selection in unobserved skills among
immigrants. Moreover, our ﬁndings suggest that TFP is more important than is apparent in
Hendrick’s careful analysis since TFP diﬀerences can account for most of the cross-country
variation in average years of schooling and in schooling quality.
5.4 Productivity of investment goods
Our quantitative analysis has focused on TFP as the main force driving output per worker
diﬀerences across countries. One implication of this assumption in the context of a neoclas-
sical growth model is that the physical capital to output ratio is roughly constant across
economies. In the data, the capital to output ratio diﬀers across countries and the litera-
ture has suggested productivity diﬀerences in the production of investment goods as one of
the explanations (e.g. Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) and Hsieh and Klenow (forthcoming)).
Hence, it is of interest to ask whether our results change if, in addition to TFP diﬀerences,
we allow for productivity diﬀerences in the investment-goods sector. We simulate an econ-
omy that features a productivity of investment goods that is 1/4 of the benchmark economy,
i.e., Ak = 1/4. This productivity diﬀerence is roughly consistent with the diﬀerence in the
relative price of capital between rich and poor countries (see for instance Jones (1994) and
Restuccia and Urrutia (2001)). In addition, we reduce the TFP level of this economy so that
output per worker relative to the benchmark economy is the same as in the economy with
relative TFP of 1/3 (and no diﬀerence in the productivity of investment goods). A relative
TFP of 3/5 in this economy produces an output per worker that is 1/21 of the benchmark
economy. Table 9 reports statistics for this economy and the economy with relative TFP of
1/3 in the baseline speciﬁcation. We observe that the aggregate statistics are quite similar
37except for the capital-to-output ratio, which in the economy with low productivity of invest-
ment goods is 1/5 of the value in the benchmark economy. We conclude that the implications
of our model are robust to the source of productivity diﬀerences. Low investment in human
capital in poor economies is driven by low wage rates, regardless of whether low wage rates
are the result of low TFP, low physical capital to output ratio, or a combination of both.
Table 9: Sectoral TFP Diﬀerences in the Model
Relative TFP (A) 1 1/3 3/5
Rel. Sector TFP (Ak) 1 1 1/4
Rel. Y 1 1/21 1/21
Rel. H 1 1/4 1/4
K/Y 2.8 2.7 0.6
Rel. K/Y 1 1 1/5
Average Years of Schooling 12.9 4.3 4.0
Returns to Schooling (%) 10.0 22.6 24.3
6 Conclusions
We developed a quantitative theory of human capital with heterogeneous agents in order
to assess the magnitude of cross-country diﬀerences in TFP that are needed to explain the
variation in cross-country output per worker. A model with heterogeneous agents allows us
to discipline the parameters governing human capital accumulation that are crucial for the
quantitative implications of the theory. Our quantitative model produces a TFP elasticity
of output per worker of 2.8. This implies that a 20-fold diﬀerence in output per worker can
be explained by a 3-fold diﬀerence in TFP. The theory suggests that using Mincer returns
to measure human capital understates human capital diﬀerences across countries by a factor
of 2. Our quantitative theory does not only imply large diﬀerences in human capital across
countries, but it also delivers diﬀerences in human capital quality that are consistent with
(i) the evidence from earnings of immigrants in the United States, (ii) the cross-country
evidence on estimates of Mincer returns, and (iii) the evidence on the relationship between
38average years of schooling and per-capita income across countries. In our theory, countries
with low TFP also exhibit (relative to the benchmark economy) high inequality in earnings
and low intergenerational correlation of earnings. We leave for future work the quantitative
evaluation of how cross-country diﬀerences in TFP, ﬁscal policies, and the support for public
education aﬀect economic inequality within countries.15
15There is abundant evidence in support of education and ﬁscal policies diﬀerences in developed and devel-
oping countries. For instance, not only poor countries tend to devote less public resources to education, but
also they tend to support tertiary education disproportionally more than primary and secondary education
relative to rich countries, with substantial distributional consequences.
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42Figure 1: Human Capital and Output






































Model refers to economies with relative TFP of 1, 0.8, 2/3, 1/2, and 1/3 in our
baseline calibration. Regression refers to an OLS regression of log human capital on
log output with a constant term resulting in: log(H) = 0.7307 + 0.4605log(Y ).
43Figure 2: Schooling and Output − Data vs. Model
































































































































Data are from Barro and Lee (1996) and Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002). We
take averages (ﬁve-year intervals) of GDP per worker in the data. This ﬁgure focuses
on the averaged data for 1990. Model refers to economies with relative TFP of 1, 0.8,
2/3, 1/2, and 1/3 in our baseline calibration. TS = z refers to economies with relative
TFP of 1, 1/2, and 1/3 for a re-calibration of the model to a time share target of z
percent. Time-only model refers to economies with relative TFP of 1 and 1/3 when
human capital accumulation features only time inputs, i.e., η = 1.
44Figure 3: Mincer Returns to Schooling − Data vs. Model

















































































Model refers to economies with relative TFP of 1, 0.8, 2/3, 1/2, and 1/3 in our baseline
calibration (with a share of time inputs in the cost of education of 90 percent). TS
= z refers to economies with relative TFP of 1, 1/2, and 1/3 for a re-calibration of
the model to a time share target of z percent. Time-only model refers to economies
with relative TFP of 1 and 1/3 when human capital accumulation features only time
inputs, i.e., η = 1.
45Figure 4: Relative Earnings of Immigrants
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Data on relative earnings of immigrants across countries is from Hendricks
(2002) and is adjusted by the level of schooling of the immigrant population.
Comparable statistics are computed from the model for diﬀerent values of the
share of time in the total cost of education. According to Hendrick’s data, the
average years of schooling of the immigrant population to the United States
from countries whose GDP per capita is between 10-20, 20-30, 30-40, and 40-50
percent of the United States is 12.8, 12.5, 12.8, and 11.7. We use this data to
calculate relative earnings in the model for workers with the same average years
of education.
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